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ABSTRACT
The paper examines the requirements of each section of
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure Section 2-619(a) in greater depth
by examining appellate and Illinois Supreme Court rulings in
cases brought under each section of 2-619(a). It also analyzes the
standards of review appellate courts apply under each section of 2619(a). Finally, because 619(a) motions require affidavits in
support of the motion, it is also necessary to consider the nature
and sufficiency of affidavits.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A 2010 survey of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure
discussed recent amendments to the Illinois Supreme Court Rules
that apply to civil practice issues and cases. 1 The survey included
a review of cases involving motions brought under section 2-619.
However, the authors did not examine section-by-section 2-619(a)
motions to dismiss in detail. Their purpose was to “illustrate the
serious, even case-dispositive, consequences that can follow from a
failure to comply fully with the Code of Civil Procedure (the ‘Code’)
and the Supreme Court Rules (the ‘Rules’).”2
Likewise, Dellinger3 recently presented an overview of 2-615
motions to dismiss based on defects in the pleadings,4 2-1005
motions for summary judgment,5 and 2-619 motions to dismiss
based on other affirmative matter.6 However, Dellinger’s article
was intended more as broad “guide for young attorneys in
understanding basic Illinois pretrial motion practice,”7 rather than
a more narrow, critical analysis of 2-619(a) motions.
This paper examines the requirements of each section of
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure Section 2-619(a) in greater depth
by examining appellate and supreme court rulings in cases
1Timothy J. Chorvat and Christine P. Benavente, Survey of Illinois Law:
Civil Procedure, 3 S. ILL. U. L.J., 807-853 (2010).
2 Id. at 807.
3Steve L. Dellinger, The Art of Motions: Understanding Illinois Civil
Pretrial Motions, 38 S. ILL. U. L.J. 183 (2014).
4735
Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-615 (2015), available at http://ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/documents/073500050K2-615.htm.
5735 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/2-1005 (2015), available at www.ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?ActID=2017&ChapterID=56&SeqStart=10200000&S
eqEnd=11500000.
6735
Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-619 (2015), available at www.ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?ActID=2017&ChapterID=56&SeqStart=6200000&Se
qEnd=8800000.
7 Dellinger, supra note 2 at 183.
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brought under each section of 2-619(a) and the standards of review
appellate courts apply under each section of 2-619(a). The purpose
is to highlight the requirements and limitations of 619(a) motions,
often overlooked by both parties and trial courts, which can cause
confusion and delays. Section 2-619(a)(9) motions can be
particularly problematic for both moving and non-moving parties
as discussed in section III.I, infra, because it is essentially a
“catch-all” for matters not specified in sections (a)1-(a)8. Not only
do both moving and non-moving parties frequently confuse the
requirements and limitations of a 619(a)(9) motion, but trial courts
do as well. Finally, because 619(a) motions require affidavits in
support of the motion, it is also necessary to consider the nature
and sufficiency of affidavits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, the
requirements of motions to dismiss under the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure 2-615 and motions for summary judgment under the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 2-1005 are compared and
contrasted to motions made under 2-619. This includes a
discussion of the necessity of affidavits as well as the nature and
sufficiency of affidavits. Second, the requirements of 619(a)
motions are discussed. Due to the volume of cases, the third
section reviews salient, representative cases in which 619(a)
motions have been made, and how the Illinois appellate courts or
the state supreme court have ruled. The fourth section is a
discussion and analysis, followed by the conclusion and
recommendations.

II. ILLLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
SECTION 2-619(A).
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 2-619 governs the involuntary
dismissal of an action by the motion of a defendant (or other party
against whom a claim is asserted) based upon specified defects or
defenses. They are in the “nature of affirmative defenses,”8
although affirmative defenses are treated separately under Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure Section 2-613.
Section 2-619 states as follows:
Sec. 2-619. Involuntary dismissal based upon certain defects or
defenses.
(a) Defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion for
dismissal of the action or for other appropriate relief upon any of the
following grounds. If the grounds do not appear on the face of the
pleading attacked the motion shall be supported by affidavit:
8 Longust v. Peabody Coal Co., 502 N.E.2d 1096, 1098 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th
Dist.1986).
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(1) That the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of
the action, provided the defect cannot be removed by a transfer of
the case to a court having jurisdiction.
(2) That the plaintiff does not have legal capacity to sue or that the
defendant does not have legal capacity to be sued.
(3) That there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause.
(4) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment.
(5) That the action was not commenced within the time limited by
law.
(6) That the claim set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been
released, satisfied of record, or discharged in bankruptcy.
(7) That the claim asserted is unenforceable under the provisions of
the Statute of Frauds.
(8) That the claim asserted against defendant is unenforceable
because of his or her minority or other disability.
(9) That the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other
affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.
....
(c) If, upon the hearing of the motion, the opposite party presents
affidavits or other proof denying the facts alleged or establishing
facts obviating the grounds of defect, the court may hear and
determine the same and may grant or deny the motion. If a material
and genuine disputed question of fact is raised the court may decide
the motion upon the affidavits and evidence offered by the parties,
or may deny the motion without prejudice to the right to raise the
subject matter of the motion by answer and shall so deny it if the
action is one in which a party is entitled to a trial by jury and a jury
demand has been filed by the opposite party in apt time.
....
(f) The form and contents of and procedure relating to affidavits
under this Section shall be as provided by rule [all emphasis
added].9,10

Affirmative defenses are set forth in Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure Section 2-613 which states in relevant part:
Sec. 2-613. Separate counts and defenses.
(d) The facts constituting any affirmative defense, such as
payment, release, satisfaction, discharge, license, fraud, duress,
9735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-619 (2015), available at www.ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?ActID=2017&ChapterID=56&SeqStart=6200000&Se
qEnd=8800000 (emphasis added).
10 The rule governing affidavits is given in ILL. SUP. CT. R. 191, discussed
infra.
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estoppel, laches, statute of frauds, illegality, that the negligence of a
complaining party contributed in whole or in part to the injury of
which he complains, that an instrument or transaction is either void
or voidable in point of law, or cannot be recovered upon by reason of
any statute or by reason of nondelivery, want or failure of
consideration in whole or in part, and any defense which by other
affirmative matter seeks to avoid the legal effect of or defeat the
cause of action set forth in the complaint, counterclaim, or thirdparty complaint, in whole or in part, and any ground or defense,
whether affirmative or not, which, if not expressly stated in the
pleading, would be likely to take the opposite party by surprise,
must be plainly set forth in the answer or reply.11

As can be seen, there is some overlap between affirmative
defenses under Illinois Code of Civil Procedure Section 2-613 and
affirmative matter as outlined in Illinois Code of Civil Procedure
Section 2-619. The distinction is that affirmative defenses must be
set forth in the answer or reply, while affirmative matters are
made by motion. For example, a defendant may move for dismissal
under 2-619(a)(6) based on satisfaction, or may assert an
affirmative defense of satisfaction under 2-613(d). Or, a defendant
may move for dismissal under 2-619(a)(7) based on statute of
frauds, or may set forth an affirmative defense of statute of frauds
under 2-613(d).

A. AFFIDAVITS
A 619 motion requires the use of affidavits to support the
motion if the grounds are not apparent on the face of the pleading,
Therefore, Supreme Court Rule 191, which governs affidavits,
must be followed. The relevant sections of Rule 191 state:
Rule 191. Proceedings Under Sections 2-1005, 2-619 and 2-301(b) of
the Code of Civil Procedure
(a) Requirements. Motions for summary judgment under section 21005 of the Code of Civil Procedure and motions for involuntary
dismissal under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be
filed before the last date, if any, set by the trial court for the filing of
dispositive motions. Affidavits…submitted in connection with a
motion for involuntary dismissal under section 2-619 of the Code of
Civil Procedure…shall be made on the personal knowledge of
the affiants; shall set forth with particularity the facts upon which
the claim, counterclaim, or defense is based; shall have attached
thereto sworn or certified copies of all documents upon which the
affiant relies; shall not consist of conclusions but of facts admissible
in evidence; and shall affirmatively show that the affiant, if sworn
11735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-613 (2015), available at www.ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/documents/073500050k2-613.htm (emphasis added).
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as a witness, can testify competently thereto. If all of the facts to be
shown are not within the personal knowledge of one person, two or
more affidavits shall be used.
(b) When Material Facts Are Not Obtainable by Affidavit. If the
affidavit of either party contains a statement that any of the
material facts which ought to appear in the affidavit are known only
to persons whose affidavits affiant is unable to procure by reason of
hostility or otherwise, naming the persons and showing why their
affidavits cannot be procured and what affiant believes they would
testify to if sworn, with his reasons for his belief, the court may
make any order that may be just, either granting or refusing the
motion, or granting a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained, or for submitting interrogatories to or taking the
depositions of any of the persons so named, or for producing
documents in the possession of those persons or furnishing sworn
copies thereof. The interrogatories and sworn answers thereto,
depositions so taken, and sworn copies of documents so furnished,
shall be considered with the affidavits in passing upon the motion
rule [emphasis added].12

Since 619(a) motions must be supported by affidavits, it is
therefore necessary first to consider what constitutes an affidavit
and the sufficiency of an affidavit under Rule 191. As
acknowledged by the Third District, neither the Code of Civil
Procedure nor the Supreme Court Rules specify a method for
testing the sufficiency of an affidavit.13 However, the Illinois
Supreme Court has stated that an objection to the sufficiency of an
affidavit should be made either by a motion to strike, or
otherwise.14
Accepting an affidavit as sufficient is normally a two-step
process.15 First, as the Supreme Court stated in Roth v. Illinois
Farmers Ins. Co.,16 “Illinois courts have defined [affidavits] in
consistent fashion for over 100 years…’[a]n affidavit is simply a
declaration, on oath, in writing, sworn to by a party before some
person who has authority under the law to administer oaths.’”17
Therefore, for a court to accept the sufficiency of an affidavit
requires first that there be a declaration, on oath, in writing,
sworn to by a party before a person who has authority under the

Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 191.
Anderson v. Dorick, 327 N.E.2d 541, 543 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1975).
14 Fooden v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. and Univs. of Ill., 272 N.E.2d
497, 501 (Ill. 1971).
15 Wm. Dennis Huber, The Curious, Perjurious Requirements of Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 12(b)3. S. Ill. U. L.J. 451-473 (2015).
16 Roth v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 782 N.E.2d 212, 214 (Ill. 2002) (citing
Harris v. Lester, 80 Ill. 307 (1875) and People v. Smith, 317 N.E.2d 300 (Ill.
App. Ct. 4th Dist.1974)).
17 Roth, supra note 16 at 493.
12
13
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law to administer oaths.18
Second, the statements in the affidavit must be made on
personal knowledge. A sworn declaration on oath in writing is
rarely, if ever, a problem in motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment. Problems have occurred when courts consider whether
the statements are made on personal knowledge. For example, the
court in People v. Schoffner ruled that where an affidavit does not
set forth specific facts to support that it is based upon personal
knowledge, the affidavit is insufficient.19
In 619(a)(9) cases, however, there is a third step. The
affidavits must be “something more” than evidence offered to
refute well-pleaded facts in the complaint.20 Furthermore:
A 619(a)(9) motion “does not authorize motions asserting plaintiff’s
essential allegations are ‘not true.’” When the defendant submits a
‘Not true’ motion, defendant’s burden of production has not been
met—there is no affirmative matter—and the burden does not shift
to the plaintiff to refute the defendant’s factual allegations
contained in the motion. Where the defendant uses the material
[external to the affidavit] to support its version of the facts, point
out the factual deficiencies in plaintiff’s case, or allege plaintiff
cannot prove his case, it is apparent the defendant is merely
challenging the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s factual allegations and
a fact-based motion such as a section 2–1005 motion should be
used.21

Affidavits in support of a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment “shall have attached thereto sworn or certified copies of
all documents upon which the affiant relies.”22 However, Section
191 requirements that affidavits “shall be made on the personal
knowledge of the affiants” and “shall have attached thereto
sworn or certified copies of all documents upon which the affiant
relies” have not always been strictly enforced.23
Some districts have interpreted the failure to attach the
18 Rule12(b) was recently revised to address the difficulties of pro se
appellants in a correctional institution. Rule12(b) now includes the following:
“(4) in case of service by mail by a pro se petitioner from a correctional
institution, by affidavit, or by certification as provided in section 1-109 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2012)) of the person who
deposited the document in the institutional mail, stating the time and place of
deposit and the complete address to which the document was to be delivered.”
19 People v. Brown, 864 N.E.2d 767, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2007).
20 Longust, 502 N.E.2d at 1098.
21 Reynolds v. Jimmy John's Enter., LLC, 988 N.E.2d 984, 1000 (Ill. App.
Ct. 4th Dist. 2013) appeal denied, 996 N.E.2d 23 (Ill. 2013) (citations omitted).
22 Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 191.
23 Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 191.
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required documents to the affidavit as “technical insufficiencies.” 24
For example, the Fifth District held that “[t]echnical
insufficiencies in affidavits submitted to court in support of motion
for summary judgment should be disregarded.”25
However, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that affidavits
that did not have the required documents attached are to be
rejected. In Robidoux v. Oliphant, 26 the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled:
We have already held that Rule 191(a)’s requirements are to be
construed according to the plain language of the rule. Here, the
plain language clearly requires that such papers be attached to the
affidavit. Moreover, supreme court rules, like statutes, should be
construed as a whole, with individual provisions interpreted in light
of other relevant provisions. The Rule 191(a) provisions barring
conclusionary assertions and requiring an affidavit to state facts
with ‘particularity’ would have little meaning were we to construe
the attached-papers provision as merely a technical requirement
that could be disregarded so long as the affiant were competent to
testify at trial.27

A defendant is required to support a motion to dismiss under
619(a) with supporting affidavits. “If the grounds do not appear on
the face of the pleading attacked the motion shall be supported by
affidavit....”28 The motion and affidavits, however, cannot attack
the factual basis of the plaintiff's claim. They are asserting “other
affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defecting the
claim.”29
However, section 2-619(c) does not require a plaintiff to
submit opposing affidavits to contest the affirmative matter. “If,
upon the hearing of the motion, the opposite party presents
affidavits or other proof denying the facts alleged or establishing
facts obviating the grounds of defect, the court may hear and
determine the same and may grant or deny the motion.” 30 Thus,
for example,
24 LaMonte v. City of Belleville, 355 N.E.2d 70, 75 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist.
1976); See also Vavadakis v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Chicago, 533 N.E.2d 70,
72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988) (referring to failure to attach required
documents as a “technical defect”).
25 LaMonte, 355 N.E.2d at 75.
26 Robidoux v. Oliphant, 775 N.E.2d 987 (Ill. 2002).
27 Id. at 996 (internal citations omitted).
28 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-619(a) (2015), available at www.ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?ActID=2017&ChapterID=56&SeqStart=6200000&Se
qEnd=8800000. (emphasis added).
29 Barber-Colman Co. v. A & K Midwest Insulation Co., 603 N.E.2d 1215,
1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1992).
30 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-619(c) (2015), available at www.ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?ActID=2017&ChapterID=56&SeqStart=6200000&Se
qEnd=8800000. (emphasis added).
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[t]he plaintiff must establish that the defense is unfounded or requires the
resolution of an essential element of material fact before it is proven. The
plaintiff may do so by ‘affidavit or other proof.’ A counteraffidavit is
necessary, however, to refute evidentiary facts properly asserted by
affidavit supporting the motion else the facts are deemed admitted.”31

However, evidentiary facts are not properly asserted by an
affidavit supporting the motion where an affidavit does not have
the required documents properly attached. 32 Therefore, “[i]f an
exhibit is attached to the complaint, the exhibit controls and a
[619(a)] motion to dismiss does not admit allegations in conflict
with facts disclosed in the exhibit.”33
If an affiant is unable to obtain documentary evidence by
reason of hostility or otherwise, such as being in the custody of the
opposing party, Rule 191(b) “permits a party filing pleadings
pertaining to summary judgment or involuntary dismissal to
submit an affidavit stating that material facts are known only to
persons whose affidavits the affiant has been unable to secure by
reason of hostility or otherwise.”34

B. MOTIONS TO DIMISS AND MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISTINGUISHED FROM
2-619(a) MOTIONS.
Section 619(a) motions are both similar to, and different from,
both motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss
(motions for judgment on the pleadings). Motions for summary
judgment are governed by section 2-1005, while motions to dismiss
are made pursuant to 2-615.
Moving parties frequently confuse 619(a) motions with 615
motions to dismiss or 1005 motions for summary judgment. 35 But
section 619 motions may be combined with either 615 motions to
dismiss or 1005 motions for summary judgment if done in parts.
Sec. 2-619.1. Combined motions.
Motions with respect to pleadings under Section 2-615, motions for

31 Kedzie and 103rd Currency Exch. v. Hodge, 619 N.E.2d 732, 735 (Ill.
1993) (emphasis added).
32 Robidoux, 775 N.E.2d at 998.
33 Perkaus v. Chicago Catholic High Sch. Athletic League, 488 N.E.2d 623,
628 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986).
34 Cordeck Sales, Inc. v. Construction Systems, Inc., 887 N.E.2d 474, 489
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.2008) citing Kane v. Motorola, Inc., 779 N.E.2d 302 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2002), as modified on denial of reh'g (Nov. 27, 2002).
35 Dellinger, supra note 2 at 237.
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involuntary dismissal or other relief under Section 2-619, and
motions for summary judgment under Section 2-1005 may be filed
together as a single motion in any combination. A combined motion,
however, shall be in parts. Each part shall be limited to and shall
specify that it is made under one of Sections 2-615, 2-619, or 2-1005.
Each part shall also clearly show the points or grounds relied upon
under the Section upon which it is based.36

Such motions are often referred to as hybrid motions. 37
However, such hybrid motions are not permitted.38 Section 2-619.1
motions must made be in parts. At the same time, the failure to
properly designate a motion as being brought pursuant to section
2-615 or section 2-619 will not require reversal unless prejudice
results to the non-movant…A hybrid motion normally will only
cause prejudice when the plaintiff is induced to forego the
submission of counter-affidavits or other material to contest a
defendant’s affirmative defense and to rely solely on his
complaint.”39
1. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The requirements for motions for summary judgment are
governed by Section 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
requirements of Section 1005 are as follows:
Sec. 2-1005. Summary judgments.
(a) For plaintiff. Any time after the opposite party has appeared or
after the time within which he or she is required to appear has
expired, a plaintiff may move with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in his or her favor for all or any part of the
relief sought.
(b) For defendant. A defendant may, at any time, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his or her
favor as to all or any part of the relief sought against him or her.
(c) Procedure. The opposite party may prior to or at the time of the
hearing on the motion file counteraffidavits. The judgment sought
shall be rendered without delay if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
36 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-619.1 (2015), available at www.ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?ActID=2017&ChapterID=56&SeqStart=6200000&Se
qEnd=8800000..
37 Dellinger, supra note 2 at 237.
38 Reynolds, supra note 21 at 990-91.
39 Downers Grove Assoc. v. Red Robin Int'l, Inc., 502 N.E.2d 1053, 1057
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986). (citations omitted).
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summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
(d) Summary determination of major issues. If the court determines
that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to one or more of
the major issues in the case, but that substantial controversy exists
with respect to other major issues, or if a party moves for a
summary determination of one or more, but less than all, of the
major issues in the case, and the court finds that there is no genuine
issue of material fact as to that issue or those issues, the court shall
thereupon draw an order specifying the major issue or issues that
appear without substantial controversy, and directing such further
proceedings upon the remaining undetermined issues as are just.
Upon the trial of the case, the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits. The form and contents of and procedure
relating to affidavits under this Section shall be as provided by rule.
40

While a 619(a) motion is similar to a motion for summary
judgment “in that affidavits and other evidentiary matter is
permitted to support the affirmative matter, and a shifting burden
of proof upon satisfaction of the defendant’s burden of producing
an affirmative matter that completely bars the plaintiff’s cause of
action,”41 a 619(a) motion should not be used as a substitute for a
summary judgment motion.42 The difference between a 619(a)
motion and a motion for summary judgment is that in a 619(a)
motion the trial court may weigh evidence and resolve factual
disputes, while in a motion for summary judgment material
factual disputes preclude summary judgment. 43
2. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
The requirements for motions to dismiss are governed by the
Code of Civil Procedure 2-615, which states:
Sec. 2-615. Motions with respect to pleadings.
(a) All objections to pleadings shall be raised by motion. The motion
shall point out specifically the defects complained of, and shall ask
40735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1005 (2015), available at www.ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?ActID=2017&ChapterID=56&SeqStart=10200000&S
eqEnd=11500000.
41 Reynolds, supra note 20, at 1000.
42 Id.; Longust, 502 N.E.2d 1096 at 1098; Malanowski v. Jabamoni, 688
N.E.2d. 732, 735 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1997)
43 Michel v. Gard, 536 N.E.2d 1375 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1989), Consumer
Elec. Co. v. Cobelcomex, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986).
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for appropriate relief, such as: that a pleading or portion thereof be
stricken because substantially insufficient in law, or that the action
be dismissed, or that a pleading be made more definite and certain
in a specified particular, or that designated immaterial matter be
stricken out, or that necessary parties be added, or that designated
misjoined parties be dismissed, and so forth.
(b) If a pleading or a division thereof is objected to by a motion to
dismiss or for judgment or to strike out the pleading, because it is
substantially insufficient in law, the motion must specify wherein
the pleading or division thereof is insufficient.
(c) Upon motions based upon defects in pleadings, substantial
defects in prior pleadings may be considered.
(d) After rulings on motions, the court may enter appropriate orders
either to permit or require pleading over or amending or to
terminate the litigation in whole or in part.
(e) Any party may seasonably move for judgment on the
pleadings.44

The difference between section 2-615 motions to dismiss and
section 2-619 motions to dismiss is that a section 2-615 motion to
dismiss is based solely on the pleadings rather than on the
underlying facts. “A section 2-615 motion is solely concerned with
defects on the face of the complaint …. In contrast, a section 2-619
motion admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint … but asks for
a dismissal based on other affirmative matters of law or easily
proved issues of fact.”45

III. A SURVEY OF SECTION 2-619 CASES
There are too many cases in which defendants moved for
dismissal under Section 2-619 to survey them all. Therefore, only
the more salient representative cases are discussed below.
As stated in Zedella v. Gibson,46 “[t]he purpose of a motion to
dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to
afford litigants a means to dispose of issues of law and easily
proved issues of fact at the outset of a case, reserving disputed
questions of fact for a jury trial.”47 Accordingly, the Fifth District
ruled in Barber-Colman Co. v. A & K Midwest Insulation Co.48
that “section 2-619 motions should not be used to attack the
factual basis of the claim itself; if such an attack is to be made, it
44 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-615 (2015), available at http://ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/documents/073500050K2-615.htm.
45 Becker v. Zellner, 684 N.E.2d 1378, 1383 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1997).
46 Zedella v. Gibson, 650 N.E.2d 1000 (Ill. 1995).
47 Id. at 1002.
48 Barber-Colman Co., 603 N.E.2d 1215 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1992).
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should be by a summary judgment motion under section 2-1005.”49
Likewise, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a 619(a)(9) motion
“admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action much
in the same way that a section 2-615 motion to dismiss admits a
complaint’s well-pleaded facts” but challenges the legal sufficiency
of the complaint. Unlike a 615 motion, however, a 619 motion
admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint, but asserts an
affirmative defense or other matter to defeat the plaintiff’s claim. 50
“Affirmative matter” is any defense “other than a negation of
the essential allegations of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” 51
Affirmative matter is “something in the nature of a defense which
negates the cause of action completely.”52 Affirmative matter
“refers to something in the nature of a defense that negates the
cause of action completely or refutes crucial conclusions of law or
conclusions of material fact contained in or inferred from the
complaint.”53 “A party may not submit evidentiary material in
support of a section 2–619 motion for the purpose of contradicting
well-pleaded facts in the complaint.”54
The Third District court in Michel v. Gard55 considered the
rules of law pertinent to the sufficiency of affidavits to support a 2619 motion. Citing Venezky v. Central Illinois Light Co.,56 and
Dangeles v. Marcus,57 the court explained that
A section 2-619 motion is not an appropriate method for a defendant
to utilize merely to controvert the allegations of ultimate facts in the
complaint…. Where the matters claimed in the affidavit as a
defense to the cause of action are nothing more than the evidence
which defendant would expect to present in contesting facts alleged
in the complaint, then the affidavits are insufficient to support a
motion to dismiss based on “affirmative matter avoiding the legal
effect of or defeating the claim.”58

The Supreme Court had another opportunity to consider the
nature of affirmative matter and the sufficiency of affidavits in

Id. at 1224.
Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, supra note 26 at 735.
51 Id.
52 Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist., 799 N.E.2d 273, 278 (Ill. 2003) (citations
omitted).
53 Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (Ill. 1999).
54 Green v. Trinity Int'l Univ., 801 N.E.2d 1208 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2003);
See also John v. Wheaton Coll., 2014 IL App (2d) 130524-U, appeal pending
(Sept. Term 2014).
55 Michel v. Gard, 536 N.E.2d 1375 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1989).
56 Venezky v. Central Ill. Light Co., 522 N.E.2d 901 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d
Dist.1988)
57 Dangeles v. Marcus, 373 N.E.2d 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.1978).
58 Michel, 536 N.E.2d at 1380.
49
50
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Longust v. Peabody Coal Co.59
‘Affirmative matter’ within the meaning of section 2-619(a)(9)…is
something in the nature of a defense that negates an alleged cause
of action completely or refutes crucial conclusions of law or
conclusions of material fact unsupported by allegations of specific
fact contained in or inferred from the complaint. It must, however,
be something more than evidence offered to refute a well-pleaded
fact in the complaint.60

In Longust, “something more” was absent because all the
defendant attempted to do in its 619 motion was to negate the
factual allegations of the complaint. The defendant merely offered
“a contrary version of the legal relationship between the parties.”61
Therefore the dismissal of the complaint was reversed with the
suggestion that the defendant should have filed a motion for
summary judgment.
Section 2-619 motions are subject to two standards of review
on appeal—abuse of discretion and de novo. An appellate court will
usually apply a de novo standard to a 619 motion to dismiss
because the motion usually does not require the trial court to
weigh facts or determine credibility. However, an abuse of
discretion standard will be applied when a motion to dismiss is
inherently procedural, such as a motion under 619(a)(3), discussed
infra, where the trial court is required to weigh the appropriate
factors in determining whether to grant a dismissal. A trial court's
decision to grant or deny comity will not be reversed absent an
abuse of discretion which occurs when a ruling is “'arbitrary,
fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would
take the same view.'"62
Some 619 sections present greater challenges than others. For
example, in a 619(a)(5) motion (“The action was not commenced
within the time limited by law”) the court must determine the date
an action was commenced and compare that date with the time
limit set by the statute under which the action was brought (e.g.,
contract, personal injury, fraud, professional malpractice, etc.). A
619(a)(2) motion (“That there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause”), on the other hand, requires
Longust, 502 N.E.2d at 1098.
Id. (citations omitted).
61 Id.
62 Performance Network Solutions, Inc. v. Cyberklix US, Inc., 966 N.E.2d
396, 402, 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2012), appeal pending (May Term 2012)
(citations omitted). Abuse of discretion standard is also applied when
reviewing a trial court’s refusal to allow an amended complaint, denial of
vacating a judgment, imposing sanctions, motions to reconsider, and motions
for attorney fees in relation to 619 motions. However, since these are not
directly related to 619 motions they are not reviewed here.
59
60
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the court to weigh and balance various factors.
The requirements and conditions of each section of 619 are
examined in the following sections.

A. Sec. 2-619(a)(1). The court does not have jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the action, provided the defect
cannot be removed by a transfer of the case to a court
having jurisdiction.
As the court stated in Russell v. Kinney Contractors, Inc., 63
“[t]he presence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction is
determined from the nature of the case and the relief sought.”
Section 2-619(a)(1) motions often arise from actions that
arguably should have been brought in another jurisdiction,
whether in another court, or in another state or another country.
For example, in a malpractice action the circuit court dismissed
the complaint on the grounds that the action should have been
brought in Indiana. The appellate court reversed and remanded.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, and
held that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
medical malpractice claim arising in Indiana.64
In Russell v. Kinney Contractors, Inc.,65 the defendant moved
to dismiss under 619(a)(1), arguing that the National Labor
Relations Act preempted state causes of action. The circuit court
dismissed the action, but the Fifth District held that the National
Labor Relations Act did not preempt state causes of action and the
court did have subject matter jurisdiction.

B. Sec. 2-619(a)(2). The plaintiff does not have legal
capacity to sue or that the defendant does not have
legal capacity to be sued.
Issues of capacity usually involve questions of minority or
mental status. However, in A Plus Janitorial Co. v. Group Fox,
Inc.,66 a dissolved corporation had commenced an action against a
former employee for various causes including breach of contract.
The First District affirmed the dismissal of the action because
even though the causes of action were based on rights that existed
63 Russell v. Kinney Contractors, Inc., 795 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Ill. App. Ct.
5th Dist. 2003).
64 Ransom v. Marrese, 524 N.E.2d 555 (Ill. 1988).
65 Russell, 795 N.E.2d at 342.
66 A Plus Janitorial Co. v. Grp. Fox, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 2013).
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prior to the dissolution, the causes of action did not accrue until
after the dissolution.

C. Sec. 2-619(a)(3). That there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause.
Section 619(a)(3) motions often arise where the defendant
asserts that another action is pending between the same parties
for the same cause in a court in another state, a court in a foreign
country, or a federal court.
For purposes of 2-619(a)(3) motions, “action” has been
interpreted as referring to proceedings “which finally adjudicate
controversy on merits.”67 However, “finally adjudicate controversy
on merits” does not mean it has already been finally adjudicated,
but will, when the action is finally concluded, have been finally
adjudicated. (A finally adjudicated action is addressed in Sec. 2619(a)(4), discussed infra.).
A 2-619(a)(3) motion is inherently procedural.68 As a
procedural tool to avoid duplicate litigation, 2-619(a)(3) motions
should therefore be construed liberally.69 At the same time, no
“bright-line test exists in determining whether the litigants’
interests in two actions are sufficiently similar…. [E]ach case is
decided on a case-by-case basis after considering all the relevant
facts.”70
Trial courts are required to weigh a host of factors before
deciding whether to grant or deny a 2-619(a)(3) motion. Decisions
to grant or deny a 2-619(a)(3) motion are discretionary with the
trial court.71 Therefore, the standard for appellate review of
Section 2-619(a)(3) motions, unlike motions under other 619
sections, is abuse of discretion.”72
Infrequently, however, a de novo standard is used. For
example, a de novo standard was used in In re the Marriage of
Marilyn D. Epsteen,73 an action by a former wife against her exhusband’s estate to enforce a judgment of divorce for support for
her adult child who was mentally disabled. The appellate court
Ransom, 524 N.E.2d at 560.
Combined Ins. Co. of Am. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London,
826 N.E.2d 1089, 1094 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2005).
69 Midas Int’l Corp. v. Mesa, S.p.A., 988 N.E.2d 679, 683 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 2013).
70 Northbrook Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. GEO Intern. Corp., 739 N.E.2d
47, 49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000).
71 Kellerman v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 493 N.E.2d 1045, 1053 (Ill. 1986).
72 Zurich Ins. Co. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 664,668 (Ill. 1996);
Kellerman , 493 N.E.2d at 1053-54 (1986); Uesco Indus., Inc. v. Cont'l Cas.
Co., 2012 IL App (2d) 120433-U, ¶ 15.
73 In re Marriage of Epsteen, 791 N.E.2d 175 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003).
67
68
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reviewed de novo the trial court’s dismissal of the action for failure
to timely file claims against her former husband pursuant to the
Probate Act for restitution for the former husband’s failure to pay
premiums on life insurance policies and for modification of
monthly support payments for their disabled child.
A trial court’s decision to dismiss an action under 2-619(a)(3)
due to another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.
An abuse of discretion is evident when the ruling is “arbitrary,
fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would
take the same view.”74
Factors that a trial court must weigh include the following:


comity, prevention of multiplicity, vexation, and
harassment, likelihood of obtaining complete relief from
foreign jurisdiction, and res judicata effect of foreign
judgment in local forum.75 (“Comity” is qualified, however.
“Comity is to be accorded to an act of a foreign court as long
as that court is of competent jurisdiction and the laws and
the public policy of the forum state are not violated.”76)



comity, prevention of multiplicity, vexation, and
harassment, likelihood of obtaining complete relief in
foreign jurisdiction, and res judicata effect of foreign
judgment in local forum, and prejudice to the nonmovant if
motion is granted against policy of avoiding duplicative
litigation.77

However, these factors are not all-inclusive, and as a matter
of discretion, a trial court may consider additional factors that
bear on its discretion.78
When a trial court weighs the above factors, “two actions need
not be identical, but rather, there need only be a substantial
similarity of issues between them.” 79 Two actions are also for the
same cause “when the relief requested is based on substantially
the same set of facts.”80 “The crucial inquiry is whether the two
actions arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, not
74 Performance Network Solutions, Inc. v. Cyberklix US, Inc., supra note
62, at 402.
75 Kellerman, 493 N.E.2d at 1053.
76 Performance Network Solutions, Inc. v. Cyberklix US, Inc., supra note
62.
77 Kapoor v. Fujisawa Pharm. Co., 699 N.E.2d 1095, 1099 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1998); Midas Int’l Corp., 988 N.E.2d at 687-88.
78 May v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 710 N.E.2d 460, 465
(Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1999).
79 Overnite Transp. Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., AFL-CIO, 773 N.E.2d 26, 32 (Ill. App. Ct.
1st Dist. 2002).
80 Id.
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whether the legal theory, issues, burden of proof or relief sought
materially differs between the two actions.”81
The “same parties” condition is met “where litigants’ interests
are sufficiently similar, even though litigants differ in name or
number.”82 The “same cause” means “that the relief sought is
requested on the same set of facts.” 83 However, “even when the
‘same cause’ and ‘same parties’ requirements are met, section 2619(a)(3) does not mandate automatic dismissal.”84
In Terracom Development Group, Inc. v. Village of
Westhaven,85 the First District ruled that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it dismissed the action as duplicative to
an action pending in federal court. The state action was an
attempt to circumvent the federal court’s order and the two actions
involved same facts and issues.
However, the First District in Rodgers v. Cook County86
reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of the state court action
brought by the representative of a deceased inmate’s estate
against the county, a doctor, and a mental health specialist for
negligence and medical malpractice after the inmate died as a
result of the denial of his prescription medicine while a federal
lawsuit against the same parties was pending. The First District
held that the “dismissal of plaintiff's claims in federal court
against the individual defendants tips the scales against
dismissing the state suit and we reverse the trial court with
directions to stay the proceedings until the federal court decides
the question of the statute of limitations.”87
The First District also ruled in Skipper Marine Electronics,
Inc. v. Cybernet Marine Products,88 that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in an action by an Illinois distributor against a
California manufacturer. The court stated that “[w]e do not find
that the relationship between the State of Illinois and the
proceedings in the present case was so strong that trial court’s
dismissal [of suit on grounds that there was another action
81 Id. See also Performance Network Solutions, Inc. v. Cyberklix US, Inc.,
supra note 69; Vill. of Mapleton v. Cathy’s Tap, Inc., 729 N.E.2d 854 (Ill. App.
Ct. 3d Dist. 2000).
82 Doutt v. Ford Motor Co., 659 N.E.2d 89, 92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1995).
83 May, 710 N.E.2d at 464.
84 Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd London,
supra note 65, Kellerman v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., supra note 68.
85 Terracom Dev. Group, Inc. v. Vill. of Westhaven, 568 N.E.2d 376 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991).
86 Rodgers v. Cook County, 998 N.E.2d 164, 175 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
2013).
87 Id. at 882.
88 Skipper Marine Elec., Inc. v. Cybernet Marine Prods., 558 N.E.2d 324
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990).
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pending
between
distributor’s
California
affiliate
and
manufacturer in California court] could be considered an abuse of
its discretion.” It also appeared that the California litigation was
broader and more dispositive of the two actions. 89
The Third District held in In re Marriage of Murugesh and
Kasilingam90 that the Illinois action was not subject to dismissal
based on a pending divorce action in a foreign country between the
same parties, because the state court was not required to recognize
or enforce divorce judgments from foreign countries under the full
faith and credit clause.91
Not all 619(a)(3) motions arise as a result of actions in other
jurisdictions. The Second District ruled in Bank of Northern
Illinois v. Nugent92 that the trial court abused its discretion in
dismissing a bank’s fraud complaint against the estate of a
deceased business owner because the facts underlying the bank’s
previous judgment entered on notes. However, the facts
underlying fraud claims in the subsequent case were not the same.
The fraud complaint sought relief not encompassed by the prior
judgment on notes.

D. Sec. 2-619(a)(4). The cause of action is barred by a
prior judgment.
The Fifth District provided an extensive review of the
requirements of a 619(a)(4) motion in Yorulmazoglu v. Lake Forest
Hospital.93 A defendant may seek to bar a plaintiff’s claim using
either a theory of collateral estoppel or res judicata. Since both
collateral estoppel and res judicata are equitable doctrines they
should only be applied using principles of fairness and justice.
Therefore, “[c]ourts must balance the need to limit litigation
against the right to a fair adversarial proceeding in which a party
may fully present its case.”94
Three conditions must be fulfilled in order to apply res
judicata (also called estoppel by judgment): there must have been
a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction; there must be an identity of cause of action; and there
must be an identity of parties or their privies. 95 Furthermore, “res
Id. at 327.
In re Marriage of Murugesh & Kasilingam, 993 N.E.2d 1109 (Ill. App.
Ct. 3d Dist. 2013), reh'g denied (Sept. 9, 2013), appeal denied sub nom.
91 Id. at 1115.
92 Bank of N. Ill. v. Nugent, 584 N.E.2d 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1991)
93 Yorulmazoglu v. Lake Forest Hosp., 834 N.E.2d 468 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th
Dist. 2005).
94 Id. at 475.
95 Id.
89
90
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judicata stands as a bar to relitigating not only the issues which
were previously tried, but also those issues which could have been
tried”96 or “might have been raised” in the previous proceeding.97A
judgment is on the merits “where it amounts to a decision as to the
respective rights and liabilities of parties based on the ultimate
facts or the state of the facts disclosed by pleadings or evidence, or
both, and on which the right of recovery depends irrespective of
formal, technical or dilatory objections or contentions” and
therefore may bar a subsequent action.98
Three conditions must also be fulfilled in order to apply
collateral estoppel (also called estoppel by verdict or issue
preclusion): the issue previously adjudicated must be identical to
the issue presented in the current action; a final judgment on the
merits must exist in the previous case; and the plaintiff against
whom estoppel is directed was a party to the prior litigation or is
in privity with such a party.99 It applies when a party or someone
in privity with a party
takes part in two separate, consecutive cases arising from
different causes of action and some fact controlling, or question
material to, the determination of both cases has been adjudicated
against that party in the prior case by a court of competent
jurisdiction…Unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel bars
subsequent actions only as to the point or question actually
litigated and determined in the prior suit, and not as to other
matters which might have been litigated and determined.100

Moreover,
unlike res judicata, mutuality of parties is not required; only one
party or his privy, the one against whom estoppel is asserted,
must be identical in the first and subsequent causes of
action…collateral estoppel will not be applied unless it appears
that the party against whom the estoppel is asserted had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior
proceeding.101
Whether a party has had a full and fair opportunity to be heard
depends on whether the party was denied a procedural,
substantive or evidentiary opportunity to be heard on the
issue…The parties need not have been arrayed on opposite sides
in the prior suit, nor must formal issues have been raised between
them….102

Singer v. Brookman, 578 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991).
Fried v. Polk Bros., 546 N.E.2d 1160 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989).
98 Id. at 1164.
99 Yorulmazoglu v. Lake Forest Hosp. supra note 90.
100 Fried, 546 N.E.2d at 1164 (citations omitted).
101 Id.
102 Id.
96
97

2015]

A Survey of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure

1029

In considering the “same evidence” test for res judicata, the
Second District court ruled in American National Bank & Trust
Co. of Chicago v. Village of Libertyville,103 that the present suit
should not have been dismissed because the relief sought in the
two actions “was sufficiently distinguishable to require different
proof and evidence.”104
In Law Offices of Nye & Associates, Ltd. v. Boado 105 the
Second District court affirmed the dismissal of an action based on
res judicata. The court held that “res judicata applied, because the
claims raised could have been litigated in a previous action that
was adjudicated to a final order on the merits, and that the trial
court correctly determined that no exceptions to the application of
res judicata applied.106
In Halverson v. Stamm,107 res judicata was not applied in a
breach of contract action by a policyholder against an automobile
insurer for recovery of medical expenses incurred in a motor
vehicle accident. The court determined that the same evidence
would not sustain both causes of action, in that the breach of
contract action required essential facts to sustain its cause of
action that were different from those in the negligence case.108
Res judicata was also not applied to a 619(a)(4) motion to
dismiss a paternity action brought by Department of Public Aid
where the minor was neither a party nor in privity with a party to
a prior action brought by the child’s mother.109
Res judicata did apply, however, to a circuit court’s
unappealed judgment dismissing an action for damages which
resulted from the death of a passenger caused by an intoxicated
minor driver.110

E. Sec. 2-619(a)(5). The action was not commenced within
the time limited by law.
Courts must necessarily look to other statutes for
determining the time limits for certain actions in 619(a)(5)
motions. Therefore, much of the trial courts’, and consequently

103 American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Vill. of Libertyville, 645
N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1995).
104 Id. at 1016.
105 Law Offices of Nye & Assocs., Ltd. v. Boado, 970 N.E.2d 1213 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2d Dist. 2012), appeal denied, 979 N.E.2d 879 (Ill. 2012).
106 Id.
107 Halverson v. Stamm, 769 N.E.2d 1076 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2002).
108 Id. at 1084.
109 Dep't of Pub. Aid ex rel. Skelton v. Liesman, 578 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. App.
Ct. 4th Dist. 1991).
110 Jachim v. Townsley, 619 N.E.2d 1317 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1993).
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appellate courts’, attention is devoted to determining what are the
limitations for commencing an action as specified in other
statutes.
The time limits differ with each type of action and specific
time limits are not reviewed here. What is reviewed are the
principles applied by the courts in determining whether an action
is barred by the time limits for that action. The standard of review
is, therefore, de novo.111
If a defendant raises a statute of limitations defense in a
619(a)(5) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must provide enough
facts to avoid the application of the statute of limitations.112
In Villanueva v. Sweiss,113 the First District affirmed the
dismissal of an action for breach of contract and negligence against
an accounting firm where the facts on the face of the complaint
showed the action was time-barred. An action for malicious
prosecution was similarly also properly dismissed as barred by the
statute of limitations.114 However, a dismissal of an action under
619(5) was reversed where the appellate court found that genuine
issues of material fact existed as to whether a company could have
asserted a breach of contract claim against defendant accounting
firms right after they stopped providing services, precluding
summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. 115

F. Sec. 2-619(a)(6). The claim set forth in the plaintiff's
pleading has been released, satisfied of record, or
discharged in bankruptcy.
If a defendant moves to dismiss an action under 619(a)(6) and
shows the existence of a facially valid release, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to prove that a material issue of fact exists which
would invalidate the agreement.116
In an action against a purchaser for breach of promissory
note, and counter-claims against the vendor for misrepresentation,
fraud, breach of contract, and duress, the Second District, in
Krilich v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago,117 held
that mutual releases entered into by all partners in a joint venture
terminated the duty of a vendor’s former partners to indemnify the
Ferguson v. City of Chicago, 820 N.E.2d 455 (Ill. 2004).
Clay v. Kuhl, 696 N.E.2d 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1998).
113 Villanueva v. Sweiss, 2014 IL App (1st) 133444-U.
114 Ghosh v. Roy, 566 N.E.2d 873 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1991).
115 MC Baldwin Fin. Co. v. DiMaggio, Rosario & Veraja, LLC, 845 N.E.2d
22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2006).
116 Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 614 N.E.2d 252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1993)
117 Krilich v. Am. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 778 N.E.2d 1153 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2002).
111
112
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vendor against claims by a purchaser. The appellate court held
that the trial court correctly dismissed Krilich’s third-party
complaint for indemnification because a mutual release
terminated the joint venturers’ duty to indemnify him for
counterclaims.
In Currie v. Wisconsin Central, Ltd.,118 the First District held
that a former employee’s claims of a “hostile work environment,
discrimination with respect to training, privileges, and conditions
of employment, and retaliation [were] in identity” with causes of
action in a prior class action against the employer for race
discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation, and had
therefore been released as a result of failing to opt out of a consent
decree approving a settlement in the class action.119
The Third District, in Dickman v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co.,120 reversed a circuit court’s judgment dismissing a farmer’s
action against a chemical company for damages for stunted corn
crops but which entered a judgment for the farmer. The chemical
company argued that the farmer had previously signed a release to
settle his claim. The farmer argued that the release was not valid
because he had not accepted his settlement check after
determining his damages were greater than amount of settlement.
The appellate court ruled that the farmer’s release was valid.
In Mason v. John Boos & Co.,121 the trial court dismissed an
injured worker’s action against his employer because his claim
was barred, first by the Workers’ Compensation Act which
provided the exclusive remedy for injured workers’ claims, and
second, because the worker’s claim had been released in a
settlement agreement. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal.
In Schultheis v. McWilliams Electric Co.,122 the trial court
dismissed an action for personal injury after the plaintiff had
accepted a check in full satisfaction of the claim. On appeal the
plaintiff argued that he did not intend a release and the defendant
could neither prove that there was an agreement to settle the
entire claim nor establish that the plaintiff had signed a release.
The First District ruled that the trial court reasonably concluded
that the “plaintiff’s endorsement and cashing of the check with
knowledge of the contents of the accompanying letter
demonstrated an intent to release defendant from the claim.”123
118

2011).

Currie v. Wisconsin Cent., Ltd., 961 N.E.2d 296 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.

Id. at 304-05.
Dickman v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 663 N.E.2d 507 (Ill. App.
Ct. 3d Dist. 1996).
121 Mason v. John Boos & Co., 959 N.E.2d 209 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2011).
122 Schultheis v. McWilliams Elec. Co., 579 N.E.2d 1100 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1991).
123 Id. at 1102.
119
120
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G. Sec. 2-619(a)(7). The claim asserted is unenforceable
under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds.
In Oliva v. Amtech Reliable Elevator Co.,124 the defendants
argued that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state
a cause of action and because an alleged agreement to extend a
lease for a second three-year term failed to comply with the statute
of frauds. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action and therefore ignored the 619(a)(7) motion.
The First District held that since the parties’ agreement did not
require that the option to extend a three-year lease be accepted in
writing, the option could be accepted either verbally or by
voluntary action manifesting an intent to exercise the option. The
plaintiff demonstrated its intent to exercise the option by holding
over and paying the increased rent due for the new term.

H. Sec. 2-619(a)(8). The claim asserted against defendant
is unenforceable because of his or her minority or other
disability.
Cases arising under 2-619(a)(8) are less common. In an action
by a minor’s next friend on behalf of the minor against a
corporation for injuries sustained on the job as a result of the
defendant’s violation of Sections 18, 19 and 26 of the Child Labor
Act,125 the corporation filed a counter-claim but the trial court
sustained the plaintiff’s motion to strike the counter-claim. A trial
resulted in a verdict against the defendant. The defendant’s
motions for a directed verdict, for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, and for a new trial were denied. The defendant appealed.
The First District found that the jury properly inferred that the
defendant did not keep a register recording data relative to minors
under the age of 16 years and affirmed the judgment of the trial
court.
“Other disability” has been interpreted to include failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, thus precluding judicial action.
For example, in a class action by a taxpayer challenging an
unemployment insurance tax assessment, the circuit court
dismissed the action. The First District court affirmed the
dismissal, ruling, in part, that the taxpayer was required to use
the administrative review process to challenge the tax

124 Oliva v. Amtech Reliable Elevator Co., 851 N.E.2d 256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 2006).
125 Hylak v. Marcal, Inc., 80 N.E.2d 411 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1948).
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assessment.126 The dissent believed that the trial court’s order
should have been reversed and the cause reinstated for a full and
proper hearing.
In Northwestern University v. City of Evanston,127 the
circuit court dismissed an action by the university against the city
alleging that a zoning ordinance that forbade commercial activity
in the university district was unconstitutional. The First District
reversed. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court and ruled that the university was obliged to
exhaust its administrative remedies.

I.

Sec. 2-619(a)(9). The claim asserted against defendant
is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal
effect of or defeating the claim.
Section 2-619(a)(9) motions are more problematic because the
section is essentially a “catch-all” for matters not specified in
sections 1-8. As a “catch-all,” it allows movants to be creative.
Frequently, issues of standing are presented. Other issues include
immunity, specific performance, and no private right of action,
among others. Not only do both moving and non-moving parties
frequently confuse the requirements and limitations of a 619(a)(9)
motion, but trial courts do as well.
There are caveats that are associated with motions to dismiss
under section 2-619(a)(9). An affirmative matter does not include
evidence upon which defendant expects to contest an ultimate fact
stated in the complaint…Accordingly, section 2–619(a)(9) does not
authorize the defendant to submit affidavits or evidentiary matter
for the purpose of contesting the plaintiff’s factual allegations and
presenting its version of the facts....Where a defendant seeks to
address the complaint’s factual allegations, a summary judgment
motion pursuant to section 2–1005 of the Code is the proper
vehicle.128

“A motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9) alleges that the
complaint must be dismissed because of ‘affirmative matter
avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.’… If the
affirmative matter is merely evidence contesting facts alleged in

126

1975).

Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Allphin, 326 N.E.2d 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.

127 Northwestern Midland Univ. v. City of Evanston, 383 N.E.2d 964 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1978).
128 Reynolds v. Jimmy John's Enterprises, LLC, supra note 21 at 995
(citations omitted).
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the complaint, use of section 2-619 is inappropriate.”129
The following sections examine types of cases brought
under 2-619(a)(9).
1. STANDING
Lack of standing is frequently raised in a 2-619(a)(9) motion
and qualifies as an “affirmative matter” which defeats the claim.
That does not imply, of course, that the movant will prevail.
Where standing is challenged by way of a motion to dismiss
based on an affirmative matter which avoids the legal effect of or
defeats the claim, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded
facts in the plaintiff’s complaint and all inferences that can
reasonably be drawn in the plaintiff’s favor.130 When an appellate
court determines that a plaintiff lacks standing to pursue an
action against a defendant, “there is no reason to examine whether
plaintiff has stated a cause of action” 131 and the action will be
dismissed.
2. IMMUNITY
Immunity is also considered an appropriate “affirmative
matter” for a 619(a)(9) motion and has been raised several times.
For example, in Van Meter v. Darien Park District,132 municipal
defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619
(a)(9) alleging that they were entitled to discretionary immunity
under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act. The circuit court granted the defendants’ motions
to dismiss, and the Second District affirmed. However, the
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court finding that
“[i]mmunity under the Act is an affirmative matter properly raised
in a section 2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss.”133
However, a supervisor’s affidavit that attempted to negate the
essential allegations of a workers’ compensation retaliatory
discharge claim and attempted to show that the employee’s
discharge was discretionary was not an “affirmative matter” that
could defeat the employee’s allegations. Therefore, the employee’s
failure to respond to the employer’s affidavit does not constitute an
adequate basis for the dismissal of [the] complaint under section
129

1988).

Venezky v. Cent. Ill. Light Co., 522 N.E.2d 901 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist.

130 Int'l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 148, AFL-CIO v. Illinois Dep't of
Employment Sec., 828 N.E.2d 1104, 1110 (Ill. 2005).
131 Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1045 (Ill. 1999).
132 Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist., supra note 29 at 367.
133 Id. at 560.
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2–619(a)(9)” because negating essential allegations of a claim is
not an “affirmative matter.134
3. MISCELLANEOUS
A defense of nonlienability is an “affirmative matter” within
the scope of 619(a)(9) sufficient to defeat foreclosure of a
mechanic’s lien.135 The defendant’s argument of nonlienability was
not merely evidence which contradicted the facts alleged in the
complaint, but would act to negate the cause of action
completely.136
The exclusivity of workers’ compensation has also been held
to be an affirmative matter sufficient to defeat an action.137
A more recent example of a miscellaneous “affirmative
matter,” coupled with a standing issue, is seen in a case in the
Seventh Circuit of the Fourth District. The case illustrates the
inconsistencies that may occur and the confusion by both a party
and the court that may be present in a 2-619(a)(9) motion.

In an action commenced in 2011 arising under the Illinois
the petitioner
petitioned the court for judicial dissolution of an Illinois not-forprofit membership corporation139 on the grounds that “those in
control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a
manner that is illegal, oppressive or fraudulent”140 since its
incorporation.
General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986,138

The corporation had been incorporated in 2002. The articles of
incorporation had created members. 141 The articles of
incorporation had also created both a board of directors and
officers.142 The articles of incorporation gave unrestricted rights to
elect both officers and directors.143 However, shortly after the

134 Smith v. Waukegan Park Dist., 896 N.E.2d 232, 238 (Ill. 2008), as
modified on denial of reh'g (Sept. 22, 2008).
135 Consumer Elec. Co. v. Cobelcomex, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 1986).
136 Id.
137 Murcia v. Textron, Inc., 795 N.E.2d 773, 776-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
2003).
138 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105 (2015), available at www.ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/ilcs5.asp?ActID=2280&ChapterID=65.
139 Huber v. American Accounting Association, (appeal denied on other
grounds, 2014 IL App (4th) 130278-U), aff’d 21 N.E.3d 433, (2014).
140 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/112.50(b)(2) (2015), available at www.ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/ilcs5.asp?ActID=2280&ChapterID=65..
141 Wm. Dennis Huber, Does the American Accounting Association exist? An
Example of Public Document Research. 3 J. FORENSIC & INVESTIGATIVE ACCT.
2, 1-67 (2011).
142 Id.
143 If the corporation is to have no members, that fact shall be set forth in
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incorporation the initial officers declared that the officers would be
the directors rather than the members electing the directors. 144
The members of the corporation elected officers but had not been
informed that the articles of incorporation had created both
officers and directors. Members were unaware they had a right to
elect directors and directors were never elected.145 The corporation
had received dues from its members since its incorporation.146
The petitioner, a member of the corporation, discovered the
irregularities in 2011 and advised the officers that they were not
legally elected as directors. 147 In response, the officers, as the selfappointed board of directors, filed a voluntary dissolution of the
corporation without a vote of the members148 and reinstated a not-

for-profit corporation with the same name that had been
incorporated in 1935 and which had been administratively
dissolved by the Illinois Secretary of State in 1996.149 The
articles of incorporation of the 1935 corporation did not create
members as did the articles of incorporation for the corporation
incorporated in 2002.

The petitioner then petitioned the court to vacate both the
dissolution of the 2002 corporation and the reinstatement of the
1935 corporation, and either to judicially dissolve the 2002
corporation150 or alternatively, to retain jurisdiction and appoint
the articles of incorporation or the bylaws. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/107.03(c)
(2015),
available
at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs5.asp?
ActID=2280&ChapterID=65. The articles of incorporation may deny or limit
the rights of members to vote. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/102.10(b) (2015),
available
at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs5.asp?ActID=2280&ChapterID=65.
144 Wm. Dennis Huber, supra note 143.
145 Id.
146 Id. See, American Accounting Association Financial Statements and
Supplemental Information Year Ended May 31, 2011 and Nine Months Ended
May
31,
2010,
http://aaahq.org/Portals/0/documents/about/Financials/FYE_May2011_Audited
FinancialStatements.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2104).
147 Id. American Accounting Association Financial Statement, supra note
141.
148 Where a corporation has members entitled to vote on dissolution, the
dissolution of a corporation may be authorized by a vote of members entitled
to vote (805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/112.15 (2015), available at www.ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/ilcs5.asp?ActID=2280&ChapterID=65.). Where a corporation
has no members or no members entitled to vote on dissolution, the dissolution
of a corporation may be authorized by a majority of the directors (805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 105/112.05 (2015), available at www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/
ilcs5.asp?ActID=2280&ChapterID=65.)
149 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/112.45 (2015), available at www.ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/ilcs5.asp?ActID=2280&ChapterID=65.
150 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/112.50(b)(2) (2015), available at www.ilga.gov
/legislation/ilcs/ilcs5.asp?ActID=2280&ChapterID=65.
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a custodian and oversee the election of a board of directors.151
Attached as an exhibit to the petition was the corporation’s
articles of incorporation from the Secretary of State on August 2,
2002.

The corporation moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to
section 2–619(a)(9) arguing that the corporation was only a
“shell” corporation. In contesting the factual allegations of the
petition, an affidavit by the corporation’s executive director
claimed not only that as a shell corporation, the corporation
never had any assets and the monies received from members for
membership dues had been deposited in accounts of a
corporation that had previously been administratively dissolved
in 1996. More important, the affidavit by the corporation’s
executive director claimed there were never any members.152
The affidavit did not have attached to it sworn or certified
copies of the documents required under Rule 191.153
The corporation thus argued that since there were never any
members the petitioner was not a member and therefore had no
standing. The corporation further argued that the petition failed
to state a cause of action and the court lacked jurisdiction since
the corporation had been dissolved by the directors.154
The trial court accepted the corporation’s executive
director’s affidavit that the corporation never had members. It
also accepted that the corporation had been dissolved. The court
dismissed, without opinion, the petition to dissolve the
corporation.155
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Section 2-619(a) motions to dismiss are more flexible than 2615 motions to dismiss. At the same time, 2-619(a) requirements
and limitations are very specific and present caveats for both
moving and non-moving parties. Both 2-615 and 2-619(a) motions
are made prior to serving an answer but they are not
interchangeable. A 2-615 motion to dismiss is based on defects in
the pleadings while a 2-619(a) motion to dismiss admits there are
no defects in the pleadings. Furthermore, a 2-615 motion to
151
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/112.55 (2015), available at
www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs5.asp?ActID=2280&ChapterID=65.
152 Huber v. American Accounting Association, supra, note 141.
153 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 191.
154 Huber v. American Accounting Association, supra note 143.
155 Id. If no reason is given by a trial court for dismissing an action, it must
be assumed that the dismissal is for the reasons argued by the movant.
Zielinski v. Miller, 660 N.E.2d 1289 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1995), as modified
on denial of reh’g (Feb 16, 1996).
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dismiss does not address affirmative defenses or affirmative
matters.
Section 2-619(a) motions cannot be used merely to controvert
the factual allegations of a non-defective complaint. If a defendant
wishes to challenge the factual allegations of a non-defective
complaint, a motion for summary judgment under 2-1005 must be
made after serving an answer.
Given the flexibility of “affirmative matter” of 619(a)(9)
motions, both moving and not-moving parties frequently confuse
the requirements and limitations of 619(a)(9) motions. Moreover,
trial courts also confuse the requirements and limitations of
619(a)(9) motions resulting in anomalous judgments that are
contrary to appellate court or supreme court rulings, particularly
with respect to the necessity and sufficiency of affidavits and
counter-affidavits.

V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper surveyed Illinois Code of Civil Procedure Section
2-619(a) motions to dismiss on a section-by-section basis. It
compared 2-615 motions to dismiss based on defects in the
pleadings, 2-1005 motions for summary judgment, and 2-619
motions to dismiss based on other affirmative matter.
Representative appellate and Supreme Court 2-619 cases were
reviewed, along with standards of review under each section, and
how appellate courts and the Supreme Court have interpreted the
necessity and sufficiency of affidavits and counter-affidavits in
support of, and in opposition to, 2-619 motions to dismiss.
As a matter of strategy, a defendant must decide whether to
attack the pleadings as defective and move to dismiss under 2-615,
admit the pleadings are not defective but present an affirmative
matter and move to dismiss under 2-619(a), or serve an answer
preserving affirmative defenses and move for summary judgment
under 2-1005.
Unless the evidence supports an affirmative matter in the
nature of an affirmative defense a defendant should not introduce
evidence in a 2-619(a) motion to challenge the factual allegations
of the complaint in an attempt to avoid answering a complaint.
Such evidence belongs in a motion to dismiss under 2-1005.

